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At the state and federal levels, the pardon power can be used to restore the
dignity and legal rights lost by a criminal conviction . Unfortunately, those
facing similar consequences from municipal convictions may not have access
to a pardon . Although clemency is exceedingly rare at any level of govern-
ment, municipal defendants face a unique structural problem that deprives
them of the possibility of a pardon . Specifically, many cities have simply
failed to create a local clemency power . This Note argues that the authority to
grant pardons for municipal offenses is part of the toolbox of powers provided
to cities through the doctrine of home rule . Accordingly, cities do not have to
wait for the permission of their parent states to create a local clemency power .
By failing to advocate for a local interpretation of clemency, cities are missing
a valuable opportunity to help municipal defendants overcome the stigma
and collateral consequences that accompany municipal convictions . While
existing scholarship largely ignores the application of clemency to municipal
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In 2013, a group of reporters descended on San Antonio City Hall eager
to document the inauguration of a momentous new tradition in city politics.
Mayor Julián Castro looked effusive as he faced reporters and proudly an-
nounced the Thanksgiving pardon of a turkey named Drumstick.1 Yet what
feels out of place about Mayor Castro’s display of Thanksgiving-spirited
clemency is not the absurdity of a mayor pardoning a turkey, but the very
thought of a mayor pardoning at all. While the pardon power has become
ubiquitous with modern American presidents and governors, the clemency2
potential of local government has largely gone ignored.3 This blind spot in
the clemency scholarship is detrimental because cities, like the states and the
federal government, have the power to foist significant financial and legal
consequences on municipal defendants.
1. Julie Moreno, San Antonio Mayor Pardons Turkey, KSAT 12 (Oct. 16, 2013, 5:50
PM), https://www.ksat.com/news/san-antonio-mayor-pardons-turkey [https://perma.cc
/5ZA7-2WYP]; Sarah Tressler, Castro Pardons Turkey, Looks Ahead to Jimenez Dinner, MYSA
(Oct. 16, 2013, 4:59 PM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local/article/Castro-pardons-
turkey-looks-ahead-to-Jimenez-4900817.php [https://perma.cc/9Y2T-UDV8].
2. “Clemency” is a multifaceted legal term that encompasses various forms of state-
sanctioned mercy and forgiveness. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrest-
ing the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 575–78 (1991). Pardons, amnesty,
commutations, remissions of fines and forfeitures, and reprieves are all legal mechanisms that
fall under the umbrella of clemency. Id .While this Note is focused primarily on understanding
how the municipal pardon power operates within the gray area of state and local law, that is
not to deny that there are clemency powers beyond pardons that have important implications
for cities. These other aspects of clemency will be explored throughout the piece.
3 . See, e .g ., Cara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123
(2012) (discussing the importance of revitalizing state clemency); Margaret Colgate Love, Rein-
vigorating the Federal Pardon Process: What the President Can Learn from the States, 9 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 730 (2012) (discussing how the federal pardon process can be improved by emu-
lating state-level pardon procedures); Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Par-
dons, Retributivists, and the United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85 (2002) (discussing
limitations on the pardon power in the state and federal context).
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In recent years, a public reckoning has exposed how local governments
have weaponized broad criminal justice regimes to exploit vulnerable com-
munities. For example, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) report on the Fer-
guson Police Department revealed that the city’s courts and police force
operationalized municipal fines to fund the city at the expense of its resi-
dents.4 The DOJ noted that in 2013 alone, over 9,000 warrants were issued in
Ferguson for cases involving minor violations like parking tickets and hous-
ing code violations.5 The DOJ also emphasized the personal tolls that this
system inflicted on individual residents. One African American woman who
was interviewed for the investigation stated that she was forced to endure an
odyssey of court dates, arrests, jail time, and additional fines all stemming
from her inability to pay a single parking ticket.6 Over seven years later, she
is still making payments on a fine that has now more than tripled.7 Similarly,
in Chicago, poor residents have struggled with debt accumulated from un-
paid parking, traffic, and vehicle compliance tickets.8 The debt has become
so crushing that many residents have turned to bankruptcy for relief.9 Add-
ing to the dire financial consequences of this situation, Chicago restricts ac-
cess to municipal jobs and licenses for those with ticket debt.10
Recognizing the great weight of municipal offenses, some mayors and
mayoral hopefuls have taken decisive steps toward embracing their authority
to grant pardons.11 In May 2018, the Omaha City Council granted Mayor
Jean Stothert’s request to expand her mayoral pardon power.12 The City
Council’s action granted Mayor Stothert the authority to pardon individuals
for virtually every criminal offense prosecutable under the Omaha City
4. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases
/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXK8-
N2KA].
5 . Id .
6 . Id . at 4.
7 . Id .
8. Melissa Sanchez & Sandhya Kambhampati, How Does Chicago Make $200 Million a




9 . Id .
10 . Id .
11. While there is a renewed interest in the municipal pardon power, the exercise of this
power is not a modern phenomenon. See, e .g ., In re Monroe, 46 F. 52, 52–53, 59 (C.C.W.D.
Ark. 1891) (“The mayor had wiped [the offense] out by his action . . . [the defendant] has been
pardoned . . . .”).
12 . Omaha City Council Broadens Mayor’s Power to Pardon, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REP.
(May 2, 2018, 10:19 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/nebraska/articles/2018-
05-02/omaha-city-council-broadens-mayors-power-to-pardon (on file with the Michigan Law
Review).
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Code, from failing to restrain a dog to prostitution.13 Similarly, in March
2019, Kansas City mayoral candidate Quinton Lucas pledged to use the par-
don power to “extinguish all stand-alone convictions for minor municipal
marijuana violations.”14
Despite the potential benefits of a pardon process, few cities have creat-
ed a local clemency mechanism.15 This means that while practically all state
and federal crimes can be pardoned, the prospect of a municipal pardon may
be a structural impossibility. In cities where a local pardon power has not
been created and where the state is unable to grant relief at the local level,
municipal defendants may not have any avenue to relief that is as effective or
complete as receiving a pardon.16 Defendants stuck within this lacuna of
state and local law are trapped inside what this Note calls the “municipal
clemency bind.” Municipal defendants facing the threat of incarceration,
fines, and collateral consequences should have the same access to clemency
as state and federal defendants.
This Note argues for an interpretation of the clemency power that is
grounded in the doctrine of home rule and local police powers. Understand-
ing the pardon power as compatible with home rule will enable and encour-
age more localities to embrace values of mercy and forgiveness. Part I
provides a primer on the organization of local government and the structure
of state-municipal sovereignty. Specifically, this Part examines the power
that cities have to criminalize offenses, the consequences that these expan-
sive penal powers have for municipal defendants, and the importance of
pardons to our criminal justice system. Part II introduces the “municipal
clemency bind” and describes the state and local mechanisms that deny de-
fendants access to a pardon process. Part II then provides a solution to this
problem by arguing that the municipal pardon power is justified under the
doctrine of home rule. Finally, Part III analyzes the administrability of the
municipal pardon power and identifies areas where clemency can be used as
an instrument to remedy broader social problems.
13 . Id .
14. Quinton Lucas, KC’s Next Mayor Should Start with Local Justice Reform to Fight
Crime, KAN. CITY STAR (Mar. 21, 2019, 8:33 PM), https://www.kansascity.com/opinion
/readers-opinion/guest-commentary/article228224579.html [https://perma.cc/4KX3-U7PK].
15 . See infra Section II.B.
16. Some states expressly provide municipal defendants with the right to appeal their
conviction to a state court. See, e .g ., OR. REV. STAT. § 221.359(1) (2017). However, there is no
common law right to appeal a violation of a municipal ordinance. 9A EUGENE MCQUILLIN,
THE LAW OFMUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 27:84 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2016) (“[U]nless guaranteed
by the constitution, [the right to review proceedings] is wholly statutory.”). Other post-
conviction relief mechanisms like habeas may exist for municipal offenses. Id . § 27:95. But
these processes alone will not help guilty defendants who seek mercy and forgiveness for their
crimes, nor will they help innocent defendants who are unable to present the kind of evidence
necessary to have their convictions overturned. As discussed infra Section II.A, additional
mechanisms like expungement cannot provide a substitute for a general clemency power.
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I. THE INTERSECTION OFMUNICIPAL LAW, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ANDMERCY
Municipal power has expanded significantly over the last century, be-
coming an omnipresent force that affects the lives of many residents. The
rise of municipal power reflects the shifting dynamics between state and lo-
cal control.17 As cities have accumulated power, municipal officials have em-
barked on ambitious social initiatives that have occasionally challenged the
interests and powers guarded by their parent state.18 Section I.A describes
the organization of municipal government and examines how these struc-
tures empower or disempower local actors. This Section also explains how
cities exercise local control through two different doctrines of state-
municipal sovereignty: Dillon’s Rule and home rule. Section I.B catalogs the
range of offenses and collateral consequences that stem from municipal
criminal law. Section I.C provides a brief overview of the pardon power’s
importance to our constitutional order.
A. The Contours of Municipal Law19
Depending on the state constitutional and statutory framework, a multi-
plicity of local government structures can exist within a single state. The
council-manager and mayor-council systems remain the most common
structural forms.20 The council-manager form lodges virtually all power with
the city council, which is empowered to pass laws and provide oversight for
the general administration of the city through the appointment of a profes-
sional manager.21 In contrast, the mayor-council form divides power be-
tween the mayor who is independently accountable to the electorate, and the
city council.22 Mayoral power in these two systems is generally characterized
as “strong” or “weak” depending on the authority a city’s form vests in the
mayor.23 For example, in mayor-council cities, the mayor may have veto, ap-
17 . See infra Section I.A.
18 . See, e .g ., City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 589 (Colo. 2016)
(noting that after the City of Fort Collins amended its municipal code to include an antifrack-
ing ordinance, the state’s oil and gas association sued to invalidate it).
19. For the purposes of this Note, the term “city” will refer to a general-purpose local
government that has the authority to enact and enforce a local penal system.
20. Victor S. DeSantis & Tari Renner, City Government Structures: An Attempt at Clari-
fication, 34 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 95, 95 (2002). Other general municipal structures like the
commission, town meeting, and representative town meeting form do exist. Id . For the pur-
poses of this Note, however, the council-manager and mayor-council systems will be the main
focuses of analysis.
21 . Forms of Municipal Government, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES, https://www.nlc.org/forms-
of-municipal-government [https://perma.cc/VH5P-Z6VJ].
22 . Id .
23 . Id .
692 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:687
pointment, and removal powers.24 In council-manager cities, the mayor is
often a de facto councilmember with no independent executive authority.25
Municipal government does not provide a clean analogue to the tradi-
tional separation-of-powers doctrine that animates politics at the state and
federal level because the functions of various city officials are often inter-
mingled.26 Nevertheless, some courts have shown a willingness to invalidate
mayoral action that appears to encroach on the power of a coordinate
“branch.”27 Other courts, however, have questioned the wisdom of mapping
traditional separation-of-powers doctrine onto municipal governance.28 The
differences in the structure and division of power within local government
affect how intergovernment conflict, corruption, and the general admin-
istrability of the municipal pardon power are understood.29
A locality’s ability to pursue policies like clemency is also affected by the
basic structural relationship between a city and its parent state. “Dillon’s
Rule” and “home rule” are the two primary models of municipal self-
governance that loosely define the level of control afforded to a city.30 Dil-
lon’s Rule, named after Judge John Forrest Dillon, who published one of the
preeminent treatises on municipal law,31 provides cities with only those
powers that are “granted in express words,” “necessarily or fairly implied in
or incident to the powers expressly granted,” or truly “essential to the ac-
complishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation.”32
Dillon’s Rule privileges the parent state’s right to exercise significant control
over how cities operate, leaving cities with limited local authority. As a re-
sult, Dillon’s Rule “conforms to the common understanding that municipali-
24. Richard C. Schragger, Essay, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Pow-
er of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2544–45 (2006).
25. Alexander J. Kasner, Note, Local Government Design, Mayoral Leadership, and Law
Enforcement Reform, 69 STAN. L. REV. 549, 559 (2017).
26 . Id . at 557–58.
27 . See, e .g ., Mun. Court v. Patrick, 254 So. 2d 193, 194–95 (Fla. 1971) (affirming the
ability of the mayor to “take command” of a city’s forces in a state of emergency, but prohibit-
ing the mayor from enacting a curfew and setting penalties for its violation). The Supreme
Court of Florida took specific pains to highlight the principles of separation of powers even in
the municipal context: “It was the Commission as the sole legislative body, and not the Mayor,
which was empowered to enact ordinances by Resolution establishing any violations and pen-
alties. . . . We must zealously guard America’s traditional separation of powers in the legisla-
tive, executive and judicial bodies of government . . . .” Id . at 194 (citation omitted).
28 . See, e .g ., Hubby v. Carpenter, 350 S.E.2d 706, 710 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that sepa-
ration-of-powers doctrine has “diminished vitality” at the municipal level because of the over-
lapping nature of functions between various local officials).
29 . See infra Section III.C.
30. JOND. RUSSELL & AARON BOSTROM, FEDERALISM, DILLON RULE ANDHOME RULE 1
(2016), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2016/01/2016-ACCE-White-Paper-Dillon-House-
Rule-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H7L-UCYW].
31. JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OFMUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (Lit-
tle, Brown & Co., 5th ed. 1911) (1872).
32 . Id . § 237 (emphasis omitted).
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ties are inferior creatures of the state . . . [and] recognizes the existence of
very limited and derivative local authority in decision-making.”33
In contrast, home rule gives cities wider latitude to pursue policies free
from state interference.34 Although home rule tends to confer greater auton-
omy, cities must still rely on their parent states to delegate authority through
statute or a state constitutional provision.35 Home rule is best understood in
terms of the dual objectives of the doctrine.36 First, home rule can grant a
city the ability to draft its own charter and pass ordinances in substantive ar-
eas that have not been expressly authorized by the state.37 Second, home rule
can immunize a city from state interference into that local decisionmaking
process.38 While home rule does not guarantee complete local control,39 it
can facilitate a city’s ability to use the police power to address issues of local
concern.40 For example, in Washington, the state constitution allows cities to
exercise “all such local police, sanitary and other regulations” that are not in
conflict with the state’s general laws.41 The broad police power created under
this system has been used to justify everything from antigaming ordinances
to the provision of broadband internet services.42
Within home rule, there is variation with respect to the underlying legal
theories that support the doctrine.43 Some states have followed the imperium
in imperio model, which creates a mini federal system in which “the state
concern[s] itself with statewide affairs” and “local matters [are] constitution-
ally delegated to local authorities.”44 This system creates a safe harbor where
cities acting within the sphere of “local” concern are effectively shielded from
33. Terrence P. Haas, Note, Constitutional Home Rule in Rhode Island, 11 ROGER
WILLIAMSU. L. REV. 677, 680 (2006).
34 . See Rick Su,Have Cities Abandoned Home Rule?, 44 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 181, 190–91
(2017).
35. Hugh Spitzer, “Home Rule” vs . “Dillon’s Rule” for Washington Cities, 38 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 809, 820 (2015).
36. Franklin R. Guenthner, Note, Reconsidering Home Rule and City-State Preemption
in Abandoned Fields of Law, 102 MINN. L. REV. 427, 440 (2017).
37 . Id . at 441.
38 . See id . at 440.
39. Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 269, 280 (1968).
40. Brian W. Ohm, Some Modern Day Musings on the Police Power, 47 URB. LAW. 625,
636 (2015).
41. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11. Washington cities also enjoy statutory grants of power.
Spitzer, supra note 35, at 857 (noting that the state legislature’s enactment of the Optional Mu-
nicipal Code provided cities with “all powers possible for a city or town to have under the Con-
stitution of this state, and not specifically denied to code cities by law” (quoting WASH. REV.
CODE § 35A.11.020 (2012))).
42. Spitzer, supra note 35, at 826, 848.
43 . Id . at 820.
44 . Id .
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state intervention.45 But historically, state courts have shown a willingness to
cabin local autonomy by narrowly interpreting the scope of “local” con-
cern.46 In contrast, some states have followed the model suggested by the Na-
tional League of Cities, which “grants municipal corporations all powers not
expressly denied to them by statute.”47 This approach, often referred to as
“legislative home rule,” shifts the authority to define municipal power to the
state legislature.48 The major limitation of local power in this system is that
when local law and state law do conflict, the doctrine of preemption acts to
resolve the conflict in favor of the state.49
The debate over municipal power has evolved significantly over the last
century. In 1902, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hunter v . City of Pitts-
burgh reflected the general consensus that cities are “political subdivisions of
the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the govern-
mental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them.”50 The Court ex-
plained that the state retains the absolute discretion to determine the extent
of the powers conferred upon cities.51 Under this Dillon’s Rule framework,
municipalities “exist[] only by an act of the state, and the state, as creator,
has plenary power to alter, expand, contract or abolish at will any or all local
units.”52 This century-old understanding of municipal power has remained
prominent in the minds of many legal scholars.53 Yet the conventional wis-
dom surrounding municipal power ignores many of the formal and informal
legal powers that local governments possess.54 This conventional wisdom al-
so fails to acknowledge some of the rationales for local independence, like
the need of a city to respond proactively to emerging challenges.55 Thus, cit-
ies had to “embrace new definitions of local concern that the ‘anachronistic’
traditional model did not contemplate.”56 A majority of states have now
moved away from Dillon’s Rule in order to take advantage of the local au-
tonomy provided by home rule.57
45. Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1124–25 (2007).
46 . Id . at 1125.
47. Spitzer, supra note 35, at 821.
48. Diller, supra note 45, at 1125–26.
49 . Id . at 1126.
50. 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). Despite the consensus around Dillon’s Rule, there were
still states like Missouri and California that were early advocates of home rule. See Spitzer, su-
pra note 35, at 817.
51 . Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178.
52. Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pt. 1), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990).
53 . Id . at 6–7 & nn.4–5.
54 . Id . at 7.
55. Guenthner, supra note 36, at 438–39 (“[C]ities needed to be nimble enough to face
challenges that the traditional model of city-state sovereignty was too rigid to regulate.”).
56 . Id .
57. Briffault, supra note 52, at 8, 10–11. The siloing of states into home rule or Dillon’s
Rule jurisdictions is complicated because the current state of municipal governance includes a
“patchwork” of differing approaches to local autonomy. See Diller, supra note 45, at 1126 &
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In the context of municipal criminal law, the sheer breadth of home rule
should not be understated. Like the taxing and zoning power, a city’s ability
to enact criminal laws in accordance with home rule has received broad def-
erence.58 As a result, localities have long enjoyed substantial authority to
criminalize behavior that offends the public order.59 In fact, cities often have
so much discretion that it is not uncommon for concurrent criminal juris-
diction to exist simultaneously between a city and the state.60 Even ordinanc-
es that appear to conflict with state statutes have been upheld by courts.61
Thus, cities have considerable authority to control their own affairs, especial-
ly as it relates to public safety and punishing criminal behavior.
B. Municipal Criminal Law and Its Consequences
Cities have the ability to criminalize a variety of behaviors, including ob-
scenity, gambling, prostitution, unlawful restraint, driving under the influ-
ence (DUI), indecent exposure, drug possession, shoplifting, vandalism,
resisting arrest, and firearm possession.62 Like states, cities have the power to
punish these offenses through imprisonment and fines.63 Even at the local
level, ordinance violations and other criminal sanctions can carry severe
consequences. For example, courts have upheld the constitutionality of city
ordinances that require convicted defendants to serve mandatory jail sen-
tences.64 Courts have also upheld a city’s right to levy seemingly exorbitant
fines.65 And even more troubling, municipal courts have exercised their au-
thority to jail defendants for their inability to pay minor violation fees like
parking tickets.66 But beyond the direct penalties associated with punishing
n.64. As a result, there may be disagreement about whether a state can be fairly categorized as a
home rule or Dillon’s Rule jurisdiction. Id . at 1127 n.65.
58. Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1409, 1413–14 (2001).
59 . Id . at 1414.
60 . Id . at 1429.
61 . See, e .g ., City of Portland v. Jackson, 850 P.2d 1093, 1093–94 (Or. 1993) (holding
that no conflict existed between a state statute that criminalized the intentional public exposure
of genitalia and a municipal ordinance that criminalized public exposure irrespective of the
defendant’s mental state).
62. Logan, supra note 58, at 1426–28 (documenting the panoply of offenses criminalized
by cities).
63. 5 MCQUILLIN, supra note 16, § 17:8.
64 . See id .
65 . See, e .g ., Moustakis v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 338 F. App’x 820 (11th Cir. 2009)
(upholding a $150 per day fine for failing to bring a personal home into compliance with mu-
nicipal code). In Moustakis, the fine eventually totaled $700,000, even though the home itself
was worth only $200,000. Id . at 821. Nevertheless, the court refused to find that the fine was
unconstitutionally excessive. Id . at 822.
66 . See, e .g ., Annie Wu, In Ferguson, People Are Tired of Being Jailed for Not Paying
Parking Tickets, EPOCH TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.theepochtimes.com/in-ferguson-
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violations of local law, these convictions have serious social implications for
an individual’s reputation and self-worth.67 A single conviction can impose
grievous and lifelong collateral consequences on an individual’s ability to
participate meaningfully in society.68
While collateral consequences are typically understood in the context of
state and federal convictions, municipal offenses can also impose serious
burdens on defendants. Under certain state, federal, and even foreign laws, a
prior municipal conviction may affect sentence enhancements,69 interna-
tional travel,70 impeachment,71 firearm rights,72 the pursuit of public office,73
licensing,74 professional discipline,75 and employment.76 Immigration law, in
particular, highlights the steep collateral consequences that can follow from
people-are-tired-of-being-jailed-for-not-paying-parking-tickets_1244363.html [https://
perma.cc/WS79-BAC7].
67 . Cf . Camila Domonoske, Legendary Boxer Jack Johnson Gets Pardon, 105 Years After
Baseless Conviction, NPR: TWO-WAY (May 24, 2018, 4:44 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections
/thetwo-way/2018/05/24/614114966/legendary-boxer-jack-johnson-gets-pardon-105-years-
after-baseless-conviction [https://perma.cc/2F4L-WAGC] (detailing the decades of stigma that
boxer Jack Johnson endured after his federal conviction).
68 . See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice: Future
Policy and Constitutional Directions, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 233, 260 (2018) (noting that
“[c]ollateral consequences have proliferated in state and federal law, creating a vast network of
restrictions on people with convictions”).
69. For example, Kansas state law allows a DUI sentence to be enhanced if the defend-
ant has a prior municipal DUI conviction. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1567(i)(1)–(3) (Supp. 2018).
70 . See, e .g ., Barred from Japan for a Teenage Pot Conviction, JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 1,
2011), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2011/02/01/voices/barred-from-japan-for-a-
teenage-pot-conviction [https://perma.cc/2G2W-J4WH].
71 . See, e .g ., Chandra S. Menon, Recent Development, State v. Tolbert: The Louisiana
Supreme Court Expands Use of Convictions to Impeach Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 78 TUL. L.
REV. 1719, 1719 (2004) (noting that the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “evidence of
municipal convictions is admissible to impeach a witness’s credibility in criminal cases”).
72 . See, e .g ., Ward v. Tomsick, 30 P.3d 824 (Colo. App. 2001) (holding that a defendant
convicted of municipal misdemeanor domestic assault was restricted from possessing a fire-
arm).
73 . See, e .g ., Osborne v. Banks, 439 So. 2d 695, 699–700 (Ala. 1983) (holding that, under
Alabama law, a municipal larceny conviction can disqualify an individual from seeking public
office because “[l]arceny is larceny and it makes no difference whether it is grand, petty, state
ormunicipal”).
74 . See, e .g ., Howell v. Metro. Sexually Oriented Bus. Licensing Bd., 466 S.W.3d 88
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (upholding the suspension of a commercial license based on the viola-
tion of a municipal ordinance).
75. For example, California law regulates the licensing and discipline of medical profes-
sionals. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 490, 2761 (a), (f) (West 2012). A conviction for an offense
like a DUI could be used as a basis for professional discipline. See Sulla v. Bd. of Registered
Nursing, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 514 (Ct. App. 2012).
76 . See Heather J. Garretson, Legislating Forgiveness: A Study of Post-Conviction Certifi-
cates as Policy to Address the Employment Consequences of a Conviction, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
1, 8–9 (2016) (“Surveys reveal that up to 92% of employers use criminal background checks in
their hiring decisions and that a criminal record reduces the likelihood of a callback by 50%.”).
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municipal convictions. An immigrant who is convicted of a crime of moral
turpitude that is punishable by a year or more in jail is subject to deporta-
tion.77 Because municipal offenses can be punished as misdemeanors with a
term of imprisonment of up to a year in jail, a municipal conviction can
complicate an individual’s ability to resist removal.78
This long list of offenses and their attendant collateral consequences
demonstrates that a municipal violation can mean more than just a littering
citation or a traffic ticket. It can mean a lifelong badge of inferiority that
even the innocent may be forced to bear.79 This is precisely why the pardon
power is so essential for the maintenance of an equitable criminal justice sys-
tem.
C. The Importance of Pardons to the Constitutional Order
The pardon power in the United States has been described as a “living
fossil”80—it balances the deferential English traditions of royal prerogative
that created the power81 and our modern skepticism of executive authority.82
At common law, the pardon power was grounded in the King’s royal prerog-
ative to grant mercy.83 In a criminal system that afforded little discretion and
flexibility in punishment, a power of this kind was fundamental.84 Not sur-
prisingly, the pardon power of the Crown was expansive. For example, the
Crown could “pardon offenses either before or after indictment, conviction,
and sentencing” and could “grant conditional or unconditional pardons
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2012). Note, the statute lays out other categories of offens-
es beyond crimes of moral turpitude that would affect a determination of removal. Id .
78 . See, e .g ., Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573, 576, 584 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding
that the petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because of a municipal theft con-
viction that carried a possible punishment of 365 days in prison). Some defendants seeking
relief from removal have attempted to split hairs by arguing that municipal violations are civil
rather than criminal offenses. See Rubio v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 344, 349 (8th Cir. 2018). Never-
theless, courts have held that as long as the municipal offense requires a finding of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, there is no basis for distinguishing violations and infractions from tradi-
tional criminal convictions. See id . at 350.
79 . See, e .g ., MARK FLATTEN, CITYCOURT: MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS LEAD TO LIFE-
LONG, “BEYOND HORRIFIC” CONSEQUENCES 1–2 (2018), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/City-court-cosequences-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/WSZ3-4BQB]
(noting the story of a Scottsdale, Arizona massage therapist who claims she was wrongfully
convicted of a municipal prostitution offense).
80. Kobil, supra note 2, at 575.
81 . Id . at 586–87.
82 . See Adam Liptak, How Far Can Trump Go in Issuing Pardons?, N.Y. TIMES (May 31,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/us/politics/pardons-trump.html [https://perma
.cc/5AA4-T5QY].
83. William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18
WM. &MARY L. REV. 475, 476 (1977).
84 . Id . at 479 (“Prior to the sixteenth century, the common law treated all homicides as
felonies. In a society with no other means of flexibility, the pardon served as the sole instru-
ment of justice for those who should not be punished.”).
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based on the performance of a precedent or subsequent action.”85 For the
most part, the pardon power was also absolute. With the exception of the
crisis surrounding the impeachment of Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby in
1678, “[t]he vesting of the clemency power in the Crown had survived in vir-
tually absolute form for almost 165 years.”86 The influence of this English
tradition eventually found its way into colonial America as the Crown dele-
gated broad clemency authority to the colonies.87 Even after emancipation,
the influence of this English legacy reverberated throughout the United
States.88
At the 1787 Constitutional Convention, figures like Alexander Hamilton
and Edmund Randolph grappled with what constitutional limitations, if any,
would be placed on executive clemency.89 Proposed limitations on the par-
don power were rejected in favor of an expansive definition of executive
clemency.90 Motivating this decision was an interest in having a robust check
on the judicial branch.91 But the Framers were also interested in the clemen-
cy power’s “justice-enhancing function” and its potential to serve the na-
tion’s “public welfare.”92 As Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist 74:
“The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity,
that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice
would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.”93 The Framers may
not have envisioned the problems plaguing the modern criminal justice sys-
tem, but they certainly understood that clemency has a role to play in reme-
dying unjust criminal penalties.
Despite the potential merits of an expansive clemency power, the lack of
substantive checks on the power has invited criticism from scholars who be-
85. James N. Jorgensen, Note, Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President’s Pre-
rogative to Escape Accountability, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 345, 349 (1993).
86. Kobil, supra note 2, at 586–87 (footnotes omitted).
87. Duker, supra note 83, at 497. What this delegation of power suggests is that even in
colonial times, there was an impulse toward local control of clemency. In fact, in England,
mayors were exercising the pardon power as early as 1669. See ROBERT EAST, EXTRACTS FROM
RECORDS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE BOROUGH OF
PORTSMOUTH AND FROM OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATING THERETO 173 (new & enlarged ed.
1891).
88. Consider Chief Justice Marshall’s description of the pardon power in United States
v . Wilson: “[T]his power had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that
nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close re-
semblance; we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon . . . .” 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833).
89. Duker, supra note 83, at 501–06.
90. Jorgensen, supra note 85, at 352–53.
91. Kobil, supra note 2, at 636.
92 . Id .
93. THE FEDERALISTNO. 74, at 376 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
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lieve it breeds abuse.94 Nevertheless, the power holds a fundamental place in
our nation’s history and legal tradition. At a basic level, a pardon can provide
defendants not only with forgiveness, but also relief from the consequences
of a conviction. Where courts may be unable to act for procedural reasons,
clemency provides a fail-safe that protects defendants from unjust punish-
ment.95 Chief Justice Rehnquist echoed this sentiment in Herrera v . Collins,
remarking that “[c]lemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradi-
tion of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice
where judicial process has been exhausted.”96 While clemency is generally
framed in terms of tangible consequences like fines and jail time, petitions
for clemency also facilitate the expression of values like forgiveness and mer-
cy.97 An example of the redemptive function of clemency can be found in
Omaha, Nebraska, where a resident seeking a pardon was recently quoted as
saying: “I wanted to ask [for a pardon] even if I didn’t get it . . . . I wanted to
express my regret, and so I did. I expressed my regret.”98 With all of these
important functions in mind, it is unacceptable that a municipal clemency
power is not part of every local criminal justice system.
II. EFFECTUATING THEMUNICIPAL PARDON POWER
Whether elected officials regularly use the pardon power or not, clemen-
cy plays an important role in our criminal justice system. Political officials of
all stripes often debate whether a grant of clemency is justified.99 But even
the most “law and order” among them would likely agree that, at a basic lev-
el, clemency should exist.100 It is surprising, then, that municipal defendants
across the country are left without any access to clemency. Section II.A in-
troduces the “municipal clemency bind” and explains how it perpetuates a
criminal justice system that offers municipal defendants no hope of clemen-
cy. Section II.B proposes that cities utilize the doctrine of home rule to create
a local clemency process.
94 . See, e .g ., Jorgensen, supra note 85, at 346 (noting that the controversies surrounding
the Iran-Contra scandal “provide incentive to reassess the nature and scope of the president’s
clemency powers”).
95. Molly Clayton, Note, Forgiving the Unforgivable: Reinvigorating the Use of Executive
Clemency in Capital Cases, 54 B.C. L. REV. 751, 762 (2013).
96. 506 U.S. 390, 411–12 (1993) (footnote omitted).
97. Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clem-
ency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1501, 1502–05 (2000).
98. Emily Nohr, Omaha Mayor Jean Stothert Wants More Power to Issue Pardons,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.omaha.com/news/metro/omaha-
mayor-jean-stothert-wants-more-power-to-issue-pardons/article_ce437764-1d58-51f0-b7c6-
dfcd98046e7e.html [https://perma.cc/WN7F-WGXA].
99 . See, e .g ., Fox News, John McCain Reacts to Chelsea Manning Commutation,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eiADzgL5Y6M.
100 . See, e .g ., Trent Franks, Opinion, Pardon America’s Toughest Sheriff, USA TODAY
(Aug. 21, 2017, 8:50 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/08/21/pardon-
americas-toughest-sheriff-editorials-debates/588506001/ [https://perma.cc/3SGX-B24N].
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A. The “Municipal Clemency Bind”
The vast majority of state and federal defendants have some basic access
to a pardon process.101 Why, then, are so many municipal defendants left
without any access to clemency? In other words, what is stopping a governor
from simply issuing a pardon for a municipal offense? While some consider
cities as simply creatures of the state,102 many state courts have declined to
extend the governor’s pardon power103 to include municipal offenses.104 In
fact, Kentucky even enshrines this gubernatorial limitation explicitly in its
state constitution.105 Though state constitutions often contain expansive gu-
bernatorial pardon language, that does not necessarily mean that the gover-
nor or an analogous state body will actually have the ability to issue a
municipal pardon. For example, under the New Mexico Constitution, the
governor has the “power to grant reprieves and pardons, after conviction for
all offenses except treason and in cases of impeachment.”106 Despite this
seemingly broad constitutional mandate, the New Mexico Supreme Court
has limited the governor’s pardon power to state offenses only.107
These limitations on the gubernatorial pardon power seem like a viola-
tion of first-order principles within state-municipal governance. After all,
while states can grant cities the authority to order their own local affairs, the
101 . See 50-State Comparison: Characteristics of Pardon Authorities, RESTORATION RTS.
PROJECT (Dec. 2018), https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-
comparisoncharacteristics-of-pardon-authorities/ [https://perma.cc/ZXZ6-L7BA]. There are
narrow categories of offenses like treason and impeachment for which a pardon is unavailable.
E .g ., TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 11; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
102. Briffault, supra note 52, at 7.
103. To avoid technical confusion, this Note will refer to the gubernatorial pardon power
as the general power of the state to pardon. While every state provides the governor with at
least some control over the pardon process, see 50-State Comparison, supra note 101, the ulti-
mate decisionmaking power may be in the hands of an independent body. For example, in
Connecticut, all pardon decisions are subject to the discretion of a board appointed by the gov-
ernor. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-124a (Supp. 2019); Act of July 1, 2019, No. 19-84, 2019 Conn.
Pub. Acts 84 (enacting minor revisions to § 54-124a).
104. At least five state high courts (Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and
Pennsylvania) have explicitly limited the governor’s ability to pardon municipal offenses. City
of Paris v. Hinton, 116 S.W. 1197 (Ky. 1909); Allen v. McGuire, 57 So. 217 (Miss. 1912); State
ex rel . City of Kansas City v. Renick, 57 S.W. 713 (Mo. 1900); City of Clovis v. Hamilton, 62
P.2d 1151 (N.M. 1936); Shoop v. Commonwealth, 3 Pa. 126 (1846).
105. The Kentucky Constitution states that the governor “shall have no power to remit
the fees of the Clerk, Sheriff or Commonwealth’s Attorney in penal or criminal cases.” KY.
CONST. § 77. However, the text of the constitution is silent as to whether the cities themselves
have the power to issue municipal pardons. Nevertheless, mayors in Kentucky have pardoned
without any kind of resistance from the courts. See Moore v. City of Newport, 248 S.W. 837
(Ky. 1923).
106. N.M. CONST. art. 5, § 6 (emphasis added).
107 . City of Clovis, 62 P.2d at 1151.
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state is still the sovereign.108 Under this reasoning, the state’s pardon power
should reasonably extend to municipal offenses. Nevertheless, state courts
have rejected constitutional constructions that give the state authority over
municipal clemency.109
In holding that the gubernatorial pardon power does not extend to mu-
nicipal defendants, courts have put forward rationales that remarkably carve
out an island of sovereignty at the expense of the state. In City of Paris v .
Hinton, the Kentucky Court of Appeals alluded to a city’s “interest” in con-
trolling the fines and penalties associated with local offenses and suggested
that this interest could be obstructed by the intrusion of a gubernatorial par-
don.110 The Hinton court also reasoned that the governor could not pardon
municipal offenses because the governor’s prerogative did not encompass
the enforcement of local law.111 Without that duty, the court saw “no reason
which require[d] [it] to extend the meaning of the words used in them to
embrace the enforcement of municipal ordinances or so as to give him the
power to pardon infractions of them.”112 Similarly, in State ex rel . Kansas
City v . Renick, the Supreme Court of Missouri justified limiting the gover-
nor’s ability to pardon municipal offenses on the grounds that “the pardon-
ing power of the state executive reaches only to matters in which the state is
interested.”113 The Renick court went on to determine that the term “offens-
es,” as used in the state constitution’s pardon provision, encompassed only
violations of state law.114 The court seemed to be highlighting a distinction
between the nature of state and municipal offenses that justified excluding
gubernatorial control over municipal clemency.115 Taken together, the case
108. Josh Bendor, Note, Municipal Constitutional Rights: A New Approach, 31 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 389, 390 (2013).
109. Note, while the existing municipal clemency jurisprudence does not recognize the
authority of the state to pardon municipal offenses, there are rare but documented instances in
which a governor has pardoned a municipal offense. See, e .g ., Samantha Marcus, Christie
Grants 10 People Clemency in Waning Days as Governor, NJ.COM (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.nj.com/politics/2017/12/christie_grants_10_clemency_in_waning_days_as_gove.
html [https://perma.cc/R6Z7-8FLV] (noting that New Jersey Governor Chris Christie par-
doned an individual convicted of a local ordinance violation). There are also instances in
which state executive officials have taken the position that a governor can pardon a municipal
offense. For example, in a 1941 advisory opinion, the Oregon attorney general stated that even
absent supporting case law, the gubernatorial pardon power encompasses municipal offenses.
20 Or. Op. Atty. Gen. 383, 383 (1941), 1941 WL 42036.
110 . See 116 S.W. 1197, 1197–98 (Ky. 1909).
111 . Id . at 1197.
112 . Id .
113. 57 S.W. 713, 715 (Mo. 1900).
114 . Id . (“[T]here is a well-recognized distinction between the nature of offenses which
consist in violation of city ordinances and of those which consist in the violation of a state
law . . . .”); see also City of Clovis v. Hamilton, 62 P.2d 1151, 1151 (N.M. 1936) (“[A]ll the au-
thorities hold that a violation of a city ordinance is not an offense against the state.”).
115. While the distinction between the nature of state and municipal offenses is not nec-
essarily rigorously examined within the limited confines of municipal pardon jurisprudence,
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law suggests that municipal defendants are unlikely to secure—or in some
cases are constitutionally barred from securing—a gubernatorial pardon.116
Unfortunately, this line of cases means that municipal defendants may not
be able to secure a direct pardon from the state.117 With the state unable to
fill this vacuum, the question of how cities can help municipal defendants
seek relief becomes critical.
States have attempted to take some of the guesswork out of determining
the proper legal foundation for the municipal pardon power by granting cit-
ies and towns the power to control clemency for themselves. For example,
Alabama,118 Kansas,119 Mississippi,120 Missouri,121 Montana,122 Nebraska,123
and the District of Columbia124 expressly provide for a municipal pardon
power through state statute. States like New Mexico,125 Pennsylvania,126
South Dakota,127 Texas,128 Utah,129 and Vermont130 do not explicitly mention
there is case law from state courts that have characterized municipal offenses as only quasi-
criminal. See, e .g ., City of Danville v. Hartshorn, 292 N.E.2d 382, 384 (Ill. 1973) (“The prosecu-
tion of municipal ordinances has been regarded somewhat ambiguously. Ordinances have long
been treated as quasi-criminal in character but civil in form.”).
116. This is not to say that it would be impossible for the State to endow itself with the
power of municipal clemency. The Supreme Court of Mississippi acknowledged as much in
Allen, where the Court in dicta stated that the “Legislature can confide the power to the Gover-
nor to pardon for offenses against municipal ordinances.” Allen v. McGuire, 57 So. 217, 217
(Miss. 1912).
117. In addition to the state court jurisprudence limiting the authority of governors to
pardon municipal offenses, states may also have a normative instinct to impose boundaries on
their own power. See, e .g ., Jim Brunner & Asia Fields, Gov . Jay Inslee Offers Pardons for Thou-
sands with Misdemeanor Pot Convictions, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 4, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://
www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/gov-jay-inslee-offers-pardons-for-thousands-
with-misdemeanor-pot-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/X8HY-6GQU] (noting that Washing-
ton Governor Jay Inslee’s marijuana clemency initiative specifically exempts relief for those
convicted of municipal offenses).
118. ALA. CODE § 12-14-15 (LexisNexis 2012).
119. KAN. STATANN. § 15-309 (2001).
120. MISS. CODEANN. § 21-15-15 (2015).
121. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 77.360, 79.220 (2016).
122. MONT. CODEANN. § 7-4-4305 (2017).
123. NEB. REV. STAT. § 15-315 (2012).
124. D.C. CODE § 1-301.76 (2001). There is a dispute between DOJ and the D.C. Mayor’s
Office about whether the Code actually gives the mayor the authority to grant clemency for all
local offenses committed in the jurisdiction. State Clemency: District of Columbia, CRIM. JUST.
POL’Y FOUND., https://www.cjpf.org/clemency-dc [https://perma.cc/K78L-7VRD].
125. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-12-3(B) (2018).
126. 8 PA. STAT. ANDCONS. STAT. ANN. § 1005 (West 2016).
127. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-29-23 (2004).
128. TEX. LOC. GOV’TCODEANN. § 54.003 (West 2008).
129. UTAHCODEANN. § 10-3b-202 (1)(d)(xi), (xiii) (LexisNexis 2015).
130. Interestingly, Vermont does not enumerate general municipal clemency powers, but
instead endows these powers with specific cities. See, e .g ., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 app., § 7-9
(2013) (“The Mayor [of Newport], with the consent of the Board of Aldermen, shall have the
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a pardon power but nevertheless recognize other municipal clemency pow-
ers like the ability to remit fines and commute sentences.
But where should municipal defendants turn if there are no state or local
clemency procedures established? The situation is further complicated by the
fact that other procedures, such as expungement, fail to serve as an adequate
substitute for a clemency power.131 While expungement can function as a
safety valve that helps address many of the concerns raised by the absence of
a pardon power,132 it alone cannot solve the municipal clemency bind. First,
expungement law varies widely between states. This is because, in the ab-
sence of some kind of exceptional circumstance, the procedure is typically
available only by statute.133 Some states make expungement easy and acces-
sible. In Wisconsin, defendants who are under the age of twenty-five at the
time of the offense are eligible to have certain offenses expunged immediate-
ly after completion of their sentence.134 Other states have expungement-like
procedures that relieve defendants of a conviction’s collateral consequences.
For example, Colorado courts have the discretion to immediately relieve col-
lateral consequences, such as those that might manifest in housing or em-
ployment, for offenders who are not sentenced to a term of incarceration.135
But in many states, the scope and availability of relief through expunge-
ment is often limited by the criminal history of the petitioner and the offense
for which they were convicted. For example, in Mississippi, expungement of
non-traffic-related misdemeanors is only available to first-time offenders.136
In North Carolina, adult defendants can only seek expungement for nonvio-
power to remit penalties for the breach of City ordinances, in whole or in part, and shall cause
the reason for such remission to be entered on the City records.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 app.,
§ 3-119 (2013) (“The Mayor [of Burlington], with the consent of the City Council, shall have
power to remit fines and costs, in whole or in part, in cases where the same are payable into the
City Treasury, and shall cause the reasons for such remissions to be entered on the City rec-
ords.”).
131. Expungement can be defined as “the process by which valid nolo contendere pleas,
findings of guilt, or admissions of guilt are later vacated, reversed, sealed, purged, or destroyed
by state expungement or rehabilitative statutes.” James A.R. Nafziger & Michael Yimesgen, The
Effect of Expungement on Removability of Non-Citizens, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 915, 916 n.4
(2003). While some scholars might differentiate expungement from other procedures like seal-
ing or the setting aside of a conviction, for the purposes of this Note, these procedures will fall
under the general definition of expungement.
132 . See Joseph C. Dugan, Note, I Did My Time: The Transformation of Indiana’s Ex-
pungement Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1321, 1321 (2015) (“[E]xpungement ensures that employers, li-
censing agencies, and communities view an individual in light of her character today rather
than the mistakes she made in her distant past.”).
133 . See George L. Blum, Annotation, Judicial Expunction of Criminal Record of Convict-
ed Adult in Absence of Authorizing Statute, 68 A.L.R. 6th 1, § 1 (2011).
134. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.015 (West Supp. 2018).
135. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-107 (2018).
136. MISS. CODEANN. § 99-19-71 (2015); Act of Mar. 29, 2019, 2019 Miss. Laws Adv. Sh.
428 (LexisNexis) (amending section 99-19-71); Act of Apr. 16, 2019, 2019 Miss. Laws Adv. Sh.
466 (LexisNexis) (amending section 99-19-71).
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lent misdemeanors.137 And in Arizona, courts are prohibited from setting
aside a conviction when the violation fits the nebulous definition of a “dan-
gerous offense.”138 Even in states that do have an adequate expungement
process, municipal defendants should nevertheless be permitted to pursue
multiple avenues of clemency. After all, if expungement were a sufficient
safety valve on its own, then the rationale for state pardons would inevitably
collapse. Further, expungement cannot completely fill the void of clemency
powers generally. Expungement is not typically used to commute a sen-
tence139 or remit a fine,140 and many expungement-like procedures are not
guaranteed to have the same legal effect in eliminating collateral conse-
quences as a pardon.141
A system built exclusively on expungement also raises concerns about
the necessary role clemency plays in our larger criminal justice system. A
modern understanding of the pardon power recognizes its “public” nature
and the importance this executive power can play in shaping a larger consti-
tutional scheme.142 In contrast, expungement typically involves an individu-
alized evaluation process in which a defendant initiates relief by petitioning
the court.143 These qualities may make it difficult for expungement to be
used as an effective public policy device. Where courts can be slow and de-
liberate, a local official can use the pardon power to act proactively in the
public interest.
Ultimately, the biggest obstacle for municipal defendants seeking relief
is not the limitations that courts have placed on the gubernatorial pardon
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-145.5 (2017).
138. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907(K)(1) (2010 & Supp. 2018); Act of Apr. 30, 2019,
§ 4, 2019 Ariz. Sess. Laws 149 (renumbering section 13-907 as 13-905 and enacting slight revi-
sions).
139. Where expungement typically refers to the erasure of a conviction, commutation
involves the “substitution of a lesser, partial, or milder punishment for the one inflicted by the
court.” See 67A C.J.S. Pardon & Parole § 6 (2013). Further, commutation would not be possible
under many expungement statutes since they require that the defendant first satisfy the obliga-
tions of their sentence. See, e .g ., VT. ST. ANN., tit. 13, § 7602(b)(1)(A) (2017) (“At least five
years have elapsed since the date on which the person successfully completed the terms and
conditions of the sentence for the conviction, or if the person has successfully completed the
terms and conditions of an indeterminate term of probation that commenced at least five years
previously.” (emphasis added)).
140 . See, e .g ., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.622(2) (Supp. 2018) (“The applicant is not enti-
tled to the remission of any fine, costs, or other money paid as a consequence of a conviction
that is set aside.”).
141 . See, e .g ., In reNolan, 19 I. & N. Dec. 539 (B.I.A. 1988) (holding that a Louisiana con-
stitutional provision that automatically pardoned certain first-time offenders was not consid-
ered an “executive pardon” and would not qualify an individual for deportation relief).
142 . See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (“A pardon . . . is not a private act of
grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme.
When granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be
better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.”).
143 . See, e .g ., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.03, subdiv. 5 (West 2018) (mandating that a peti-
tion for expungement demonstrate a benefit to the individual petitioner).
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power or the inadequacy of mechanisms like expungement. Instead, it is the
fact that few cities have taken it upon themselves to create a clemency pro-
cess at the local level. Where the state is prohibited from granting a pardon
and where the city believes it is unable to establish a basic pardon process,
municipal defendants are stuck in a bind that does not affect similarly situat-
ed state and federal defendants. States can provide cities with clemency pow-
ers through statute.144 But cities, especially those with robust local criminal
enforcement schemes, do not have to wait for the state to act. Instead, they
should invoke the doctrine of home rule to advocate for a municipal pardon
power.
B. Locating the Pardon Power Within the Doctrine of Home Rule
Municipal clemency should not be thought of as challenging the bound-
aries of local action. Rather, the clemency power should be understood as a
logical extension of the police powers already provided by home rule. If one
assumes, as home rule states do, that cities are entitled to a measure of au-
tonomy—especially when it comes to the exercise of their police powers—
then a municipal pardon power should be made more widely available. This
Section situates the pardon power within a broader legal framework rooted
in basic home rule principles.145
Though few cities have embraced its use, the municipal pardon power is
an appropriate application of a city’s police power. The social and economic
costs that municipal fines and convictions impose on communities are mat-
ters of local concern that cities have an inherent interest in addressing. Thus,
a municipal pardon power, operationalized under the police power, is a tool
that cities can use to manage the struggles of municipal defendants. The his-
tory of municipal power reflects a distinct “public” character premised on
local police powers and regulation in the public interest.146 While the
amount of authority provided to cities can vary, home rule generally gives
144 . See, e .g ., ALA. CODE § 12-14-15 (LexisNexis 2012). A statutory grant of pardon au-
thority is not an answer to the municipal clemency bind. For example, a group of lawyers lob-
bied Ferguson Mayor James Knowles III to grant amnesty to nonviolent offenders in 2014.
Jason Rosenbaum, Attorneys Ask Ferguson’s Mayor to Commute Non-Violent Ordinance Of-
fenses, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Aug. 26, 2014), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/attorneys-
ask-fergusons-mayor-commute-non-violent-ordinance-offenses#stream/0 [https://perma.cc
/98TK-DDMX]. Even though Missouri provides some cities with local clemency powers
through statute, the statute applies to “third class cities,” which does not include Ferguson. Id .
Adding to this problem, the city has not taken the initiative to create a local clemency power
for itself. Id .
145. This Section focuses on home rule jurisdictions. Cities would likely find it too diffi-
cult to justify the local creation of a pardon power under Dillon’s Rule.
146 . See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 12 (1996) (“The legal doctrines and practices guaranteeing
the rights of municipalities to regulate social and economic life were testaments to the im-
portance of nonconstitutional public law to the American polity.”).
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cities police powers to enact local law without the permission of the state.147
A city’s ability to use its police powers to regulate the “health, comfort and
general welfare” of its residents has long been recognized and affirmed.148
Over time, the police power has evolved to embrace more applications of lo-
cal control. As the New Mexico Supreme Court stated in State ex rel . Hughes
v . Cleveland, “[t]raditionally, [the police power] was limited in its operation
to laws concerned with the public health, safety and morals. This historic
field for its operation now has been extended to embrace laws for the pro-
motion of the general welfare, prosperity, comfort and convenience.”149
The quality of life in a community can be seriously affected by aggressive
penal regimes that compound problems like financial instability150 and re-
cidivism.151 Recognizing that these issues are matters of local concern, cities
have used a broad conception of the police power to address these problems.
For example, cities across the country have pursued initiatives to ease the
burden that the formerly incarcerated face when searching for employ-
ment.152 Cities like Los Angeles have put the police power to work by passing
ordinances that prohibit employers from discriminating on the basis of an
applicant’s criminal history.153 Specifically, Los Angeles’s 2017 ordinance
highlighted the city’s interest in “eliminating [barriers] to employment,” “re-
ducing recidivism,” and facilitating reintegration for those with prior convic-
tions.154 If a city can justify an employment discrimination ordinance under
the familiar refrain of promoting the “public health, safety and welfare” of its
residents,155 then the creation of a local clemency power must also be justi-
fied. Municipal clemency could be used to discharge debt, prevent unneces-
sary incarceration, and remove collateral consequences that hinder an
individual’s ability to integrate and contribute to his or her community.156
Considering municipal clemency’s wide range of applications, there are
many ways the power could be used to effectuate a city’s interest in protect-
ing the general welfare of its residents.
Not only is the pardon power an acceptable application of the state’s po-
lice power, it is also a logical complement to a city’s existing criminal en-
147. Ohm, supra note 40, at 636.
148. 6A MCQUILLIN, supra note 16, § 24:34.
149. 141 P.2d 192, 200 (N.M. 1943).
150 . See Sanchez & Kambhampati, supra note 8.
151 . Cf . John G. Malcolm & John-Michael Seibler, Collateral Consequences: Protecting
Public Safety or Encouraging Recidivism?, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 7, 2017), https://
www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/LM-200.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N8H-UZL7].
152. Betsy Pearl & Lea Hunter, Second Chance Cities: Local Efforts to Promote Re-Entry
Success, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 19, 2018, 9:02 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org
/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2018/04/19/449474/second-chance-cities-local-efforts-pro
mote-re-entry-success/ [https://perma.cc/7QPW-ZGJV].
153. L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE, ch. XVIII, art. 9, § 189.00 (2017).
154 . Id .
155 . Id .
156 . See infra Section III.A.
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forcement powers. If state courts are comfortable upholding exercises of the
police power like the implementation of a public nudity ordinance,157 then
there should be some space in the doctrine to accommodate a city’s use of
the clemency power to pardon that same behavior. Home rule gives cities the
authority to construct sweeping penal systems that criminalize a litany of
criminal behaviors.158 If a city is given broad discretion to penalize, then the
power to forgive should be implied in that power.159
One potential difficulty in harmonizing the pardon power and tradi-
tional understandings of municipal control may be that clemency is typically
thought of as an executive power.160 It is unclear where distinctly executive
actions fit into this clemency framework because some states define munici-
pal authority in terms of legislative power.161 As Dillon states, cities are en-
dowed with powers by the legislature and these powers are of a “legislative
and administrative” character.162 Ordinances that regulate matters like waste
disposal or the obstruction of thoroughfares are part and parcel of that pow-
er. But compared to these quintessentially legislative actions, does the execu-
tive character of the pardon power somehow create dissonance? First, the
distinction between executive and legislative functions may be inapt consid-
ering the overlapping nature of municipal government.163 Second, even if
this distinction is salient, framing the pardon power as a purely executive
function may not be necessary. After all, the pardon processes in some states
reflect a trend toward decentralizing executive control of clemency.164 This
trend also appears at the local level, where the mayoral power to grant clem-
ency is expressly conditioned on the approval of nonexecutive officials.165
Furthermore, some state courts have rejected the proposition that municipal
clemency must be birthed in the cradle of executive authority. In Moore v .
City of Newport, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that the municipal
pardon power does not have to be vested in the mayor.166 Thus, at the local
157. State v. Lilley, 204 A.3d 198, 213–14 (N.H. 2019).
158. Logan, supra note 58, at 1425–28.
159 . Cf . Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 310 (1855) (“Without such a power of
clemency, to be exercised by some department or functionary of a government, it would be
most imperfect and deficient in its political morality, and in that attribute of Deity whose
judgments are always tempered with mercy.”).
160 . See, e .g ., Darling v. State, 45 So. 3d 444, 455 (Fla. 2010) (stating that “[c]lemency is
an executive power”).
161 . See, e .g ., ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 11 (“A home rule borough or city may exercise all
legislative powers not prohibited by law or by charter.”); N.M. CONST. art. X, § 6D (“A munic-
ipality which adopts a charter may exercise all legislative powers and perform all functions not
expressly denied by general law or charter.”).
162. DILLON, supra note 31, at 453 n.2.
163 . See supra Section I.A.
164 . See infra Section III.C.
165 . See, e .g ., Allen v. McGuire, 57 So. 217 (Miss. 1912) (noting that the city code at issue
required that any mayoral clemency action receive the consent of the board of aldermen).
166 . See 248 S.W. 837, 838 (Ky. 1923).
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level, framing the pardon power as a purely executive function may not be
necessary. Finally, even if the pardon power is purely executive, mayors have
performed executive functions like protecting a city from insurrection and
restricting behavior in a state of emergency.167 As a result, executive action is
not itself in conflict with the character of municipal power.
Cities hoping to institute a local clemency power must also confront the
threat of preemption. Preemption is a driving force that defines the outer
limits of a city’s home rule power in most jurisdictions.168 Traditional appli-
cations of home rule “favored city power that did not interfere, or have the
potential to interfere, with state-level schemes that could be applied even-
ly.”169 Where there is a conflict between state and local law, the doctrine of
preemption mandates that the conflict be resolved in favor of the superior
authority.170 In the pardon power context, however, preemption problems
are a remote concern. Express preemption is a nonissue because no state has
explicitly forbidden a city from exercising a municipal pardon power.171
Implied preemption, either through conflict or field preemption,172 is al-
so unlikely to present a threat to a local clemency power.173 Intrastate con-
flict preemption occurs when a local law “substantially interferes with state
law or the state’s constitutional responsibilities.”174 It is difficult to imagine a
situation in which a city’s local clemency power would literally conflict with
or frustrate the state’s clemency objectives. Courts that have addressed the
topic of state control of municipal clemency have held that states have no au-
thority to grant a municipal pardon.175 Thus, a city’s local clemency action
cannot conflict with an objective or power that the state does not possess.
The municipal clemency jurisprudence also reflects the sentiment that states
have a limited enforcement duty with respect to local law.176 This further
167 . See, e .g ., Mayor of Baltimore v. Silver, 283 A.2d 788 (Md. 1971) (upholding the abil-
ity of the mayor to form a posse comitatus to preserve the peace); State v. Dobbins, 178 S.E.2d
449 (N.C. 1971) (upholding the mayor’s ability to declare a state of emergency and impose a
curfew); Farmer v. City of Sapulpa, 645 P.2d 518 (Okla. 1982) (upholding the mayor’s ability to
restrict water usage in the event of an emergency).
168. Diller, supra note 45, at 1125–26.
169. Guenthner, supra note 36, at 438.
170. Miles Coleman, Note, Banning the Flames: Constitutionality, Preemption, and Local
Smoking Ordinances, 59 S.C. L. REV. 475, 480 (2008).
171. This Note has not identified any state statute that expressly forbids a local pardon
power.
172. The degree and form of implied intrastate preemption can differ between states.
Lauren E. Phillips, Note, Impeding Innovation: State Preemption of Progressive Local Regula-
tions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2225, 2234 (2017).
173. Note, in some states the risk of implied preemption may not even be applicable be-
cause the state only recognizes express preemption. Paul S. Weiland, Comment, Federal and
State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 267
(2000).
174. Diller, supra note 45, at 1141–42.
175 . See supra note 104.
176 . See City of Paris v. Hinton, 116 S.W. 1197, 1197–98 (Ky. 1909).
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supports the proposition that the state has little claim over the area of mu-
nicipal clemency. The state does have an interest in controlling clemency for
state-level offenses, but a city’s exercise of a local clemency power does not
obstruct that prerogative.
Even if one assumes that the state does have some recognized interest or
power in the arena of municipal clemency, conflict preemption still poses a
negligible threat because a conflict between state and local control of munic-
ipal clemency is not necessarily presumed. Unlike areas such as international
relations where the superiority and exclusiveness of a department or entity’s
power must be given near total deference,177 the pardon power does not op-
erate under the same imperative. It is not necessary that the pardon power be
held exclusively by one entity. At the federal level, an exclusive power doc-
trine has theoretically not stopped Congress from holding an amnesty pow-
er.178 Similarly, many states structure the pardon power around a power-
sharing arrangement between the governor and the legislature.179
Even though basic tenets of federalism stop federal and state officials
from holding a concurrent pardon power for state and federal offenses,180
this same dynamic should not apply to municipal pardons. First, several
states have already recognized or hinted at a form of joint authority for pow-
ers that could be shared between state and municipal executives. Illinois, for
instance, expressly allows cities to exercise power “concurrently with the
State . . . to the extent that the [legislature] by law does not specifically limit
the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State’s exercise to be exclu-
sive.”181 In Allen v . McGuire, the Supreme Court of Mississippi stated that
the legislature could theoretically give the governor the power to pardon
municipal offenses, but it did not expressly rule out the possibility that the
municipal pardon power could be exercised at both the state and local lev-
els.182 Second, the logic of concurrent power aligns with the general ap-
177 . See generally Kerry Abrams, Essay, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601
(2013).
178. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896) (“Although the Constitution vests in the
President ‘power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except
in cases of impeachment,’ this power has never been held to take from Congress the power to
pass acts of general amnesty.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 2)); see also Henry Weihofen, Leg-
islative Pardons, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 371, 374 (1939).
179 . See, e .g ., IDAHO CONST. art. 4, § 7 (setting out the creation of a Board of Pardons by
legislative enactment and providing the legislature with the power to “prescribe the sessions of
said board and the manner in which application[s] shall be made”).
180 . See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[The President] shall have Power to grant Re-
prieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States . . . .” (emphasis added)).
181. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i); Michael W. Halpin, Note, Is the Living Wage Dead in
Detroit? The Role of Stare Decisis, Home Rule, and Policy Preferences in the Michigan Supreme
Court, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 911, 923.
182 . See 57 So. 217, 217 (Miss. 1912) (“Of course, the Legislature can confide the power
to the Governor to pardon for offenses against municipal ordinances; but, until it has done so,
he has no such power under the Constitution.”). Nowhere does the court embrace the idea that
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proach courts have used to “preserve local autonomy by avoiding the finding
of a state-local conflict” and “determin[ing] that differing state and local
regulations of the same subject are not inconsistent.”183
Likewise, field preemption does not present an obstacle to a city’s local
clemency pursuits. Intrastate field preemption occurs when the state’s regu-
lation of an area of law is so extensive that it prohibits a city from supple-
menting the field with its own enactments.184 But in the municipal clemency
context, states have passed statutes that expressly delegate the municipal
pardon power directly to cities.185 In fact, the state regulations that do exist
are premised on cities having the basic authority to enact a local clemency
power.186 Were these states actually interested in occupying the field, they
would not have expressly invited cities to control clemency for themselves.
Even if one accepts the proposition that the pardon power is preempted,
that would lead to the conclusion that municipal criminal law, generally,
would also be preempted. Traditionally, the state legislature was responsible
for determining the definition and scope of criminal punishment.187 This
was especially true in the context of “general criminal laws.”188 However,
“any inference of state hegemony with respect to criminal law making would
be entirely incorrect.”189 For example, criminal assault and battery offenses
are generally considered state concerns, yet violations involving physical vio-
lence are still criminalized at the municipal level.190
Once it is established that a city is acting within the confines of home
rule, the next issue is determining where that power is anchored. Unlike the
United States Constitution, most municipal charters do not feature a vesting
clause that would allow a mayor to command a swath of implied powers.
Courts would likely insist that the pardon power still be grounded in some
kind of explicit authorization.191 But as long as the action is properly local, is
authorized by local law, and does not trigger preemption issues, a city should
be able to exercise the pardon power in accordance with home rule.
Ultimately, the broad leeway cities have with respect to local criminal
law supports the justification of the pardon power as a matter of responsive
if it conferred the municipal pardon power onto the governor that it would have to simultane-
ously divest the city of its power.
183. Briffault, supra note 52, at 17.
184. Diller, supra note 45, at 1141.
185 . See supra Section II.A.
186 . See, e .g ., MO. REV. STAT. § 77.360 (2016).
187. Logan, supra note 58, at 1424–25.
188 . Id .
189 . Id . at 1425.
190 . Id . at 1428.
191 . See Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 537 N.W.2d 436, 440 (Mich. 1995)
(“Generally a mayor has only that authority which is expressly or impliedly conferred upon
him by charter or by the council acting within the scope of the charter.”).
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and practical governance.192 For example, the Supreme Court has articulated
little concern about the lack of judicial controls over municipal criminal
law.193 Without substantive judicial controls, the pardon power becomes
perhaps the only way for some municipal defendants to seek forgiveness,
correct injustices, and relieve the collateral consequences of conviction.
While the pardon power could address these important social issues, it could
also give rise to serious abuses. Cities must confront how to integrate and
manage this power at the local level.
III. THEADMINISTRATION OF THEMUNICIPAL PARDON POWER
In 1988, H.T. Mathis, the Mayor of Florala, Alabama, was impeached
and removed from office on charges of neglect of duty and incompetence
stemming from his use of the pardon power.194 Mayor Mathis stood accused
of abusing his office after pardoning “more than 100 traffic offenders, in-
cluding 27 drunken drivers.”195 A city clerk even quoted the mayor as saying,
“I have more power than Ronald Reagan.”196 Mayor Mathis epitomizes the
dark mythology of local politics: corrupt mayors, abuses of power, and a
community powerless to effect change. Mayor Mathis’s exercise of the par-
don power, and other abuses like it, may cast doubt on the efficacy of vesting
a pardon power in a municipal authority. On the other hand, Mayor
Mathis’s demise serves as an important reminder that, even at the local level,
abuses of power can be controlled by public scrutiny and proper structural
checks. Cities need not fear that the pardon power will devolve into a cabal
of palm-greasing and double-dealing.
A thoughtfully designed and implemented process can ensure that local
officials exercise their clemency powers responsibly. Further, letting the fear
of corruption dash the creation of a local clemency process not only denies
individual defendants the benefits of a pardon power, but it also squanders
the opportunity to utilize clemency as a tool to remedy broader social issues.
This Part examines the administrability of the municipal clemency process
and analyzes the policy rationales that justify the pardon power. Section
III.A discusses the social imperative of instituting a municipal clemency pro-
cess. Section III.B addresses concerns about local corruption and describes
various checks that would curb improper uses of the power. Finally, Section
III.C outlines specific policy proposals that would not only guard against the
possibility of local corruption but also encourage local officials to use clem-
ency effectively.
192 . Cf . Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification of Executive
Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 132 (2005).
193. Logan, supra note 58, at 1415–16.
194 . Mayor Who Pardoned Drunk Drivers Is Removed, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 1988), https://
www.nytimes.com/1988/09/01/us/mayor-who-pardoned-drunk-drivers-is-removed.html
[https://perma.cc/8VN2-GE42].
195 . Id .
196 . Id .
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A. The Social Imperative to Institute a Municipal Pardon Process
Cities can use the municipal pardon power to tackle a myriad of social
problems that are experienced by both individual residents and the commu-
nity as a whole. Considering that municipal law already touches so many as-
pects of everyday life, cities should embrace clemency as not only consistent
with the expansion of local power, but curative of its excesses.
While this Note has detailed the serious collateral consequences faced by
individuals convicted of municipal offenses, the pardon power also has the
potential to alleviate some of the broader social problems caused by overex-
pansive municipal penal regimes. Cities have a checkered history of using
local power to exclude and alienate minorities from the community.197 To-
day, racially disparate municipal policing continues to affect how individuals
live and participate in their community.198 For example, municipal defend-
ants who face unpaid fines and, by consequence, the possibility of arrest may
find it difficult to engage in civic life.199 The crisis in Ferguson highlights this
dynamic. Lawyers working on behalf of municipal defendants in Ferguson
lobbied local officials to create a clemency power, arguing that such a power
could “bridge the gap between the town’s largely white leadership and the
African-American community.”200 A local clemency power could do more
than just release individuals from the devastating effects of fines and jail
time—it could be used as a powerful tool of community building and racial
equity.
Cities could also use the pardon power to advocate for humanitarian in-
terests at the national level. Consider the context of immigration. A full and
unconditional municipal pardon can shield an immigrant convicted of a
crime of moral turpitude from deportation.201 Some cities, like Denver, have
enacted sweeping municipal sentencing reforms—though not the pardon
power—to protect immigrant communities.202 But municipal defendants
should not have to wait for city councils to enact comprehensive criminal
197. Amy P. Meek, Street Vendors, Taxicabs, and Exclusion Zones: The Impact of Collat-
eral Consequences of Criminal Convictions at the Local Level, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2014).
198 . See Rose Hackman, Bratton-Style Policing Means More Fines and Arrests for Black
Residents of Detroit, GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/money/2014/sep/07/safer-detroit-fines-racial-profiling-black-residents [https://perma.cc
/7WEZ-ER37] (noting the way city policing practices can affect the displacement of communi-
ties of color).
199. Rosenbaum, supra note 144.
200 . Id .
201. The Board of Immigration Appeals has recognized the full legal effect of a municipal
pardon on removal. In re C—R—, 8 I. & N. Dec. 59 (B.I.A. 1958).
202. The rationale for the policy is that by reducing the maximum penalty for certain
offenses to a term of less than one year, Denver is able to circumvent the tripwire that triggers
removal. Jon Murray & Noelle Phillips, Denver Is Set to Change Its Sentencing Ordinance to
Help Some Immigrants Avoid Deportation, DENV. POST (Apr. 27, 2017, 4:35 PM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2017/04/27/denver-sentencing-reform-immigrants-deportation/
[https://perma.cc/JF2W-52H2].
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justice reform, especially when mayors could use the pardon power to pro-
vide immediate relief.
The history and constitutional tradition of clemency in the United States
also support the use of the pardon power as a broad instrument of social pol-
icy. Modern history is replete with examples of “activist” pardoners-in-chief.
President Jimmy Carter’s grant of amnesty to Vietnam draft evaders203 and
President Barack Obama’s 2014 Clemency Initiative204 are both examples of
ambitious social policies centered on executive clemency. There is no reason
to believe that municipal clemency could not be deployed in the same way.205
B. Municipal Authorities Can Be Trusted with a Pardon Power
Fears of local corruption should not stop cities from instituting a local
clemency process. State and federal officials are entrusted with a panoply of
awesome powers that can run afoul of democratic institutions and ideals
when used improperly.206 But when power is abused, competing branches of
government and voters can engage accountability mechanisms.207 The same
is true for municipal clemency. The municipal pardon power can be prem-
ised on a system of robust checks and balances and political accountability.
Even though the specter of corruption is often lodged in society’s conven-
tional understanding of local politics, it is worth noting that Americans still
trust local government more than state government.208
Like federal and state pardons, some municipal pardons may lead to
graft.209 History shows, however, that officials entrusted with the pardon
power generally exercise restraint in the face of political realities.210 Like
203. Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 593, 598 n.29 (2012).
204 . See Peter Baker, Obama Plans Broader Use of Clemency to Free Nonviolent Drug Of-
fenders, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/04/us/obama-plans-
broader-use-of-clemency-to-free-nonviolent-drug-offenders.html [https://perma.cc/B7DP-
RVYD].
205 . Cf . Sanjay K. Chhablani, Legitimate Justice: Using Clemency to Address Mass Incar-
ceration, 16 U.MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER&CLASS 48, 61–62 (2016).
206 . See, e .g ., Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Horta-
tory Fluff”?, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 335, 337 (2006).
207 . Cf . Ilya Somin, The Political and Judicial Reaction to Kelo, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy
/wp/2015/06/04/the-political-and-judicial-reaction-to-kelo [https://perma.cc/P9MJ-ZZMQ].
208. Justin McCarthy, Americans Still More Trusting in Local over State Government,
GALLUP (Sept. 19, 2016), https://news.gallup.com/poll/195656/americans-trusting-local-state-
government.aspx [https://perma.cc/VW9B-5WYX].
209 . See Max Kutner, No President Has Pardoned Himself, but Governors and a Drunk
Mayor Have, NEWSWEEK (July 24, 2017, 2:22 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-
granting-himself-pardon-governors-641150 [https://perma.cc/7BCG-WH42].
210 . See Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on
the President’s Duty to Be Merciful, 27 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 1483, 1495 (2000) (“It appears more
likely that pardon’s declining incidence since 1980 is attributable to the politics of crime con-
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Mayor Mathis, those that do issue “unscrupulous” pardons often pay the po-
litical consequences of those actions.211 Beyond the political check from vot-
ers, municipal officials would also have to be mindful of institutional checks
within local government. Even at the local level, the “executive” and “legisla-
tive” branches of government can police each other’s actions.212 Some state
legislatures have even made concerted efforts to limit the gubernatorial par-
don power after instances of unscrupulous pardons.213 As detailed in the
next Section, a city council or analogous municipal body could do the same.
There are also practical limitations built into the structure of local gov-
ernments that can curb an overexpansive use of the municipal pardon pow-
er. Imagine a situation in which a mayor gets into a political skirmish with a
local law enforcement official. In an act of political retribution, the mayor
preemptively pardons all municipal offenders who happen to have been cit-
ed, fined, or arrested that day. The mayor’s actions would effectively turn the
acts of local law enforcement into a nullity. Beyond earning the ire of voters
and other local political institutions, the mayor’s overexpansive use of the
pardon power would create serious consequences for the integrity of the city.
Likewise, a clemency policy of mass pardons and accompanying remittances
could dramatically impair a city’s revenue stream.214 This reality would cause
the municipal authority to internalize the economic costs of using the par-
don power too liberally. Together, these institutional realities are among the
many checks that reduce the likelihood of unscrupulous pardons.
C. The Responsible Administration of the Municipal Pardon Power
Even if Mayor Mathis is the rule rather than the exception, there are
ways to vindicate the municipal pardon power while insulating the city from
potential abuse. The United States Constitution places few textual re-
strictions on the presidential pardon power. In fact, Alexander Hamilton was
trol, a politics that has produced some of the most potent and divisive electoral issues of the
last thirty years.”).
211. Scott Neuman, When Pardons Become Political Dynamite, NPR (Jan. 13, 2012, 3:38
PM), https://www.npr.org/2012/01/13/145179319/when-pardons-become-political-dynamite
[https://perma.cc/Y8AK-HC93].
212 . See, e .g ., Elizabeth Fine & James Caras, Twenty-Five Years of the Council-Mayor
Governance of New York City: A History of the Council’s Powers, the Separation of Powers, and
Issues for Future Resolution, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 119, 126–30 (2013–2014) (noting that the
New York City Council and the mayor have occasionally “disagreed on how far the Council’s
legislative powers extend or where the Mayor’s executive authority begins and ends”).
213 . See Santos v. Brown, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 245 (Ct. App. 2015) (noting that after
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger issued a publicly controversial commutation, the
state legislature enacted several new checks on the governor’s clemency power such as a victim
notification requirement).
214 . See, e .g ., Jonathan Blanks, The NYPD’s Work Stoppage Is Costing the City Lots of
Money . That’s Great for New Yorkers ., WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/posteverything/wp/2015/01/07/the-nypds-work-stoppage-is-costing-the-city-lots-of-
money-thats-great-for-new-yorkers [https://perma.cc/69KT-ACZC].
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skeptical of any language that might hamper the president’s ability to exer-
cise this power.215 States, though, have experimented with various checks on
the gubernatorial pardon power to promote accountability.
Local governments should draw from the lessons of these state pardon
processes and create a municipal pardon authority that is cabined by public
notice and internal checks. Notice requirements are found in many state
pardon procedures. For example, the Arkansas Constitution requires the
governor to provide the legislature with information about the individuals he
or she has pardoned and the reasons for the pardon.216 The Maryland Con-
stitution provides that information about the pardon be published in a
newspaper.217 And in Alabama, the Board of Pardon and Paroles may not
issue a pardon unless the action is taken at an “open public meeting” and no-
tice is given to the state attorney general, the chief of police, the county sher-
iff, and the district attorney and trial judge who participated in the case.218
These constitutional provisions, along with similar state statutory provisions,
ensure transparency and give voters access to valuable information that can
be used as a political check.219 Cities could similarly include notice require-
ments when designing the clemency process.220
Cities should also consider adopting a pardon approval process like
those found in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. In Massachusetts, the gov-
ernor’s ability to pardon is conditioned on the advice of a separate elected
entity, the Massachusetts Governor’s Council.221 Modeling the municipal
pardon power off of this mechanism would create an extra layer of account-
ability. Alternatively, cities and towns could rely on the already-existing city
council as an advice and consent mechanism. Rhode Island uses this ap-
proach by conditioning the governor’s ability to pardon on the advice and
215 . See THE FEDERALISTNO. 74, supra note 93, at 376 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Humani-
ty and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as
little as possible fettered or embarrassed.”).
216. ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 18 (“He shall communicate to the General Assembly at every
regular session each case of reprieve, commutation or pardon, with his reasons therefor; stating
the name and crime of the convict, the sentence, its date, and the date of the commutation,
pardon or reprieve.”).
217. MD. CONST. art. II, § 20 (“[H]e shall give notice, in one or more newspapers, of the
application made for it, and of the day on, or after which, his decision will be given; and in eve-
ry case, in which he exercises this power . . . .”).
218. ALA. CODE § 15-22-23(b)(1), (2) (LexisNexis 2018).
219. Note, some courts that have interpreted notice requirements have essentially nulli-
fied those provisions. See, e .g ., In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 414 (Miss. 2012) (holding that the
violation of the procedural publication requirement would not render a pardon facially void).
220. Some state statutes already mandate that cities provide notice. See, e .g ., ALA. CODE
§ 12-14-15 (LexisNexis 2012) (stating that after a clemency action has been executed, the
mayor “shall report his action to the council or other governing body . . . with his reasons
therefor in writing”).
221. MASS. CONST. ch. II, § I, art. VIII; see also In re Op. of the Justices, 98 N.E. 101, 102
(Mass. 1912) (“The granting of a full or a partial pardon is the result of concurrent action by
both the Governor and the Council. Neither alone can take effective action.”).
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consent of the state senate.222 The efficacy of the Massachusetts and Rhode
Island approaches will inevitably depend on the size of the city and the way
the clemency power is structured.223 Smaller cities may not have the re-
sources or demand to justify a Massachusetts-modeled body to independent-
ly evaluate the clemency actions of municipal officials. And though the
possibility of multiple layers of checks provides robust oversight in theory, in
practice it could completely paralyze the power.224 While cities will have to
take into account their own unique circumstances, there are plenty of ways
to tailor these accountability mechanisms to local needs.
CONCLUSION
Municipal governments criminalize a broad range of behaviors. The col-
lateral consequences that attend these municipal convictions are stark. From
immigration to employment, the shadow of a municipal conviction can pre-
vent the rehabilitated and even the innocent from reintegrating into society
and moving on with their lives. The idea of a mayor wielding the pardon
power may conjure fears of corruption and favoritism. But cities must be
cognizant of the human consequences that come with not extending this
power. As the Framers debated the clemency power in 1787, they too were
concerned about the potential for abuse that this power may invite. Yet they
felt the need to leave the clemency power unfettered because good policy
demanded that mercy and forgiveness be a key part of the criminal justice
system. In that same vein, municipalities should strive to give municipal de-
fendants the same opportunity for clemency that state and federal defend-
ants enjoy.
In a majority of states, it is unclear if municipal defendants can count on
state action to alleviate their suffering. This is why it is incumbent on cities
to use the powers afforded to them by home rule to exercise not only the
power to punish but also the power to forgive. Cities regularly use home rule
as the basis for an array of local actions. It is time that cities make clemency a
priority and release municipal defendants from a bind that leaves them
without hope of a pardon. Municipal clemency will never be a cure-all for
the myriad of social problems that intersect our criminal justice system. Still,
having a local authority that is empowered to grant pardons could provide
relief where it is both desperately needed and otherwise unavailable.
222. R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 13.
223. In addition to structure and size, these accountability measures may also depend on
exactly where the pardon power is vested. Naturally, in a mayor-council system, the mayor
would wield the power, subject to certain constraints. In a council-manager system, however,
exactly who would hold the power is not as intuitive. The clemency power could be lodged in
the city manager or the council generally.
224 . Cf . Maggie Clark, Governors’ Pardons Are Becoming a Rarity, GOVERNING (Feb. 8,
2013), http://www.governing.com/news/state/sl-governors-balance-politics-with-pardons.html
[https://perma.cc/F95V-QZ6E] (“In Rhode Island, the Senate must approve every pardon ap-
plication before it can be granted. Needless to say, very few offenders receive pardons in Rhode
Island.”).
